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Editor's Note: This article is actually the first chapter of a biography of Yap Thiam Hien which 
Daniel Tev had almost completed when he died on July 29, 2006. Arlene Lev has kindly given 
us permission to publish it here in her husband's memory, pending the eventual publication of 
the entire manuscript. We take this occasion to inform readers that the next issue of Indonesia 
will contain a special In Memoriam for Dan Lev, written by his friend Goenawan Mohamad.
Yap Thiam Hien (1913-1989) was a lawyer and human rights activist. He was a founding 
member of the Badan Permusyawaratan Kewarga-Negaraan Indonesia (Baperki) and a major 
proponent of strengthening the rule of law in Indonesia. He defended the unpopular former 
foreign minister, Subandrio, in the Mahmillub [Military Tribunal-Extraordinary] trials in 
1966 and was a firm advocate of the full legal equality of Chinese Indonesians. He was closely 
involved in the Legal Aid Institute (LBH, Lembaga Bantuan Hukum) and in nearly every major 
national project of legal reform or defense of human rights in Indonesia. He was the first 
recipient of the justice William ]. Brennan award for the defense of Human Rights.
Ask just about anyone who knew Yap Thiam Hien and soon you will be told that 
what accounted for his character is that he was from Aceh. Indonesia's ethnic variety 
makes for this kind of easy, stereotypical generalization. Javanese are soft-spoken, 
subtle, manipulative, and sophisticated masters of compromise. Minangkabau (from 
West Sumatra) are business-like traders, while north-Sumatran Bataks are tough, 
vulgar, and self-serving. Acehnese, from the northern-most tip of Sumatra, are 
devoutly Islamic, stubborn, independent, and given to violence. Yap Thiam Hien was 
indeed stubborn, uncompromising, blunt, principled, and outspoken; so it must be, of 
course, because he was from Aceh. Occasionally, in lighter vein but also with a note of 
pride, Yap explained himself in the same way.
If only it were so. As tempting as these simple-minded formulae are, they fall apart 
in no time under even mildly rigorous questioning. If Aceh explains Yap Thiam Hien, 
why aren't there more Yap Thiam Hiens, whether ethnically Chinese or ethnically
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Acehnese, from Aceh? Or for that matter—since Yap's qualities are sometimes 
attributed to (or blamed on) his Christianity—why aren't there many more Indonesian 
Christians like him? The questions provoke puzzled silence.
It is not that Aceh is unimportant to explaining Yap Thiam Hien. It is in fact 
critically important, but not in the simplistic terms of cultural style that most people 
mean. Actually, he did not have all that much to do with stereotypical Aceh or 
Acehnese—not enough so, in any event, to have had a profound influence on him. 
Where he grew up, in Kutaradja (now Banda Aceh, the capital of the province), which 
could as well have been the title of this chapter, the majority of the population then 
were, like himself, Chinese. He did not speak Acehnese, or even a Chinese language, as 
it happens, but rather Malay and Dutch. His education, from start to finish, was Dutch. 
And to make matters more complex, the woman who cared for and deeply influenced 
him after his own mother died was a Japanese immigrant. So much for the Aceh factor.
Yet, in other ways, Aceh's influence explains a great deal about Yap Thiam Hien. 
That he was born there means, obliquely, that he was not from Java, which dominated 
the colony and now dominates the independent state. He was always an outsider, in 
some ways even a stranger, to the intricate networks of family associations and power 
in the Javanese center. And, of course, Aceh is where he grew up until age thirteen. 
The earliest formative influences on him, from family and education, were obviously 
from there. Those influences make sense, however, only with the help of some light 
shed by the history into which Yap was born. It is a mistake to try to understand him 
simply as a Chinese, but it is impossible to understand him without attention to the 
flow of Chinese immigration, the structure of the ethnic Chinese community, and the 
colonial state that established the conditions of Chinese existence in the Netherlands- 
Indies. There is no need here to recapitulate the entire history of the Chinese minority 
in Indonesia, but a few brief comments will help.1
By the middle of the nineteenth century, when Yap Thiam Hien's great-great 
grandfather arrived on the island of Bangka, Chinese communities in Indonesia 
already had a long history that gave them a distinctly Indonesian cast with its own 
coloration and fault lines. Chinese were relatively secure but not altogether 
comfortable in the Netherlands-Indies. Unlike Thailand, where the absorption of 
Chinese immigrants was eased by ethnic and religious affinity and not obstructed by a 
European-dominated state, in Indonesia the immigrants were decidedly different in an 
ethnically Malay society and predominantly (though often superficially) Islamic 
setting; and where colonial authority surrounded them. Unlike Malaysia, where large 
numbers of Chinese immigrants—eventually enough to make up about 33 percent of 
the population—could protect themselves adequately, in Indonesia they only 
constituted about 3 or 4 percent—though maybe more, for a precise and persuasive 
estimate is hard to come by—and so were always vulnerable. They fit into the colonial 
economy of the Netherlands-Indies, as elsewhere in Southeast Asia, as a superior 
source of hard-working talent to perform particular jobs that the Dutch were not
1 For a voluminous new, detailed, and interesting description and interpretation of ethnic Chinese as they 
were enveloped into Indonesian history, see Benny G. Setiono, Tionghoa dalam Pusaran Politik (Chinese in 
the vortex of politics) (Jakarta: Elkasa, 2003). For a much shorter but useful introduction to ethnic Chinese 
in Indonesia, see G. William Skinner, "The Chinese Minority," in Indonesia, ed. Ruth T. McVey (New 
Haven, CT: Yale Southeast Asian Studies and HRAF, 1963), pp. 97-117.
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interested in (so-called middlemen roles), but which, by colonial logic, were best 
denied to indigenous Indonesians. As a minority—since the mid-nineteenth century 
legally classified as "Foreign Orientals," as were the smaller groups of Arabs, Indians, 
and Japanese until early in the twentieth century—Chinese were intrinsically 
vulnerable and dependent on Dutch goodwill. They were never popular with the 
Dutch, who found them useful but not likeable. They had always to be kept in their 
place. In 1740 Chinese had been brutally massacred by Dutch and indigenous bands in 
Batavia (now Jakarta) and elsewhere along the north coast of Java. Few such reminders 
were necessary.
Although conveniently conceived by the Dutch and most Indonesians as an 
undifferentiated aggregate, the Chinese were, of course, diverse (like minorities nearly 
everywhere), with their own elongated class structure and cultural cleavages. They 
were divided not only by provincial Chinese origins, languages, and customs, but also 
more deeply by the extent of their adaptation in Indonesia. Like most immigrants 
anywhere, the longer they stayed the more likely they were to assimilate and 
acculturate. By the nineteenth century, a distinct stratum had long since emerged of 
acculturated peranakan—"children of the land," or baba, as they were usually called in 
Sumatra as in Malaya across the straits. As Chinese women did not begin to join the 
men until relatively late, many immigrants married Indonesian women, indicating 
perhaps that local prejudice needed time, encouragement, and the right conditions to 
flourish. Some Chinese probably were absorbed into an Indonesian genetic stream. 
Many others who were not gradually drifted into local cultural streams, assimilating 
local values and norms, relinquishing Chinese roots (though not necessarily identity) 
and putting down new ones in local history and language. The Indonesian Chinese 
peranakan was as different from Chinese elsewhere as the American Jew was from Jews 
elsewhere or the French Armenian from Armenians elsewhere.
By contrast, new immigrants, called totok (full blood or newcomer) in Indonesian or 
singkeh ("new guest," Mandarin xinke), as always came fully equipped with rich 
memories of the homeland, mainly Kwantung and Fukien provinces, and their 
Hokkien, Hakka, and other languages. They remained totok beyond the first and 
second generations so long as these memories and the language lasted. Between 
peranakan and totok, the one deracinated but at home and the other with identity intact 
but essentially foreign, tension was inevitable. Looking down (on) and up (to) at the 
same time cannot be easy, but it is a discomfort with which distinct generations of 
immigrants everywhere have no doubt learned to live.
The differences between peranakan and totok were social and economic as well as 
cultural, and became increasingly so in the twentieth century as new educational and 
career opportunities became available. The more recent immigrant, limited by 
language and connections, was more likely to feel restricted to whatever money­
making opportunities there were. This usually meant opening a shop of some sort, 
which, with ability and luck, might develop into something more profitable. Despite 
the myth of Chinese business acumen, many never made it beyond the cart or small 
store. By contrast, the peranakan, equipped with Javanese, say, and Malay and possibly 
Dutch, eventually had a wider range of choices. He (and in time she) could imagine 
becoming a doctor or lawyer or clerk or teacher as well as a shop owner or
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businessman. For some, once this happened (in about the 1910s), it became almost a 
matter of pride not to be good at trading, the mark of the totok Chinese.
Like other ethnic groups in the colony, the Chinese were governed indirectly and at 
minimal cost to the Dutch administration. Basic patterns of indirect rule were 
established in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by the Dutch East India 
Company, the private ancestor of the colony that was formally created in the early 
nineteenth century after the conclusion of the Napoleonic wars. The governing 
principle was that "like should rule like," with each ethnic community administered by 
its own leadership: Europeans by the Dutch, Javanese by Javanese, Chinese by 
Chinese, Arabs by Arabs, and so on. Through the agency of separate ethnic elites, for 
each of which a mutually advantageous relationship was fashioned, the Dutch 
governed the whole. Indirect rule over Java, the heartland of the country, was 
predicated on a political alliance between the Dutch and the Javanese royal houses and 
the priyayi aristocracy. The same pattern basically held elsewhere as Dutch power 
penetrated the rest of the archipelago.
As Chinese immigrants had no obvious governing class, the Dutch created one for 
them. Officieren—with military ranks of majoor, kapitein, and luitenant, depending on 
the importance of the locale and the community—were appointed by the colonial 
authorities to administer to Chinese needs according to Dutch requirements. These 
Chinese officieren were not of the same order of importance as the Javanese 
bureaucratic aristocracy, or of indigenous elites elsewhere, because in the colonial 
scheme of things the Chinese were considered to be fundamentally less important. 
Conceived as intermediaries between the Dutch and the Chinese, officieren were 
intended to: maintain order in their communities, make sure that Dutch orders were 
carried out, inform the administration about affairs in the Chinese zones, and represent 
their communities to the colonial government.2
Williams has argued that the officieren barely deserve consideration as instruments 
of indirect rule.3 By the twentieth century, indeed, the institution had begun to 
collapse, losing the respect of Chinese communities and the economic perquisites and 
political support once supplied by the colonial administration. When the officieren 
disappeared with the colony, they had long since ceased to exercise any real authority. 
Still, they meant a good deal until early in the century, a point of some importance here 
because Yap Thiam Hien belonged to the family of an officier. Officieren were influential 
enough because the colonial government relied on them and they reaped huge benefits 
as a result. They did not have the status of indigenous rulers, and so were not treated 
as respectfully, but they received no less by way of advantage. Local aristocracies were 
compensated, for their services to the colony, with guarantees of their political 
positions and social status. The Chinese officieren were granted pachten, monopolies, 
over the immensely profitable opium trade, for example, and other commercial 
opportunities. Like ethnic Indonesian elites, the officieren were accorded special 
privileges of legal status and access to superior Dutch education.
2
On the officieren, see Lea E. Williams, Overseas Chinese Nationalism: The Genesis of the Pan-Chinese Movement 
in Indonesia, 1900-1916 (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1960), pp. 124ff and passim.
3 Ibid., p. 125.
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As new strata of educated Indonesians, including Chinese Indonesians, began to 
come into their own and to think about change early in the twentieth century, 
privileged elites came under attack. Indigenous aristocracies, the Javanese priyayi 
particularly, had no difficulty surviving, because they were essential to the Dutch and 
no one doubted their authority among the peasant majority. The officieren had no such 
advantage. Before the turn of the century, their dealings in opium had turned 
especially odious among Dutch reformers, so that this monopoly, among others, soon 
was taken over by the colonial administration.4 More than anything else, it was the loss 
of these financial benefits that destroyed the institution of officieren. Thereafter the 
colonial administration tried to revive it with various incentives, some of them shallow 
and silly, but it declined steadily.5 There was too little popular Chinese support to 
shore up the officieren, who were, after all, the servants of an administration not 
obviously sympathetic to the Chinese, and whose services were no longer all that 
useful to many and were irritating to others. Peranakan and singkeh alike, affected by 
the nationalist wave emanating from China, contemptuously lumped the officieren 
together with zoning laws and travel restrictions as humiliations imposed on the 
Chinese. A Dutch journalist, Henri Borel, distinguished between the officers of Java 
and the outer islands, challenging the former because they were peranakan and 
therefore no longer authentic Chinese, while the latter, to his mind, were more 
legitimate precisely because they were mainly singkeh.6 While Borel's point reveals 
some odd thinking about who was Chinese, it also calls attention to the important 
differences between the Chinese of Java and the other islands, only one of which, 
Sumatra, interests us here. In Java, as Dutch authority and economic control were 
consolidated, the Chinese population stabilized under the domination of long-time 
resident peranakan families well known in Javanese society and Dutch administrative 
circles. By the middle of the nineteenth century, Chinese immigration to Java had 
slowed. Outside of Java, where Dutch power began to extend rapidly in the second 
half of the nineteenth century, new Chinese immigration followed suit as the Dutch 
sought workers for the plantations of East Sumatra and the tin mines of Bangka and 
Belitung (Billiton), islands off the eastern coast. At the same time, immigrants were 
pouring into western Malaya, also to mine tin, and Singapore.
The resulting demographic changes were less significant for Indonesia than for the 
British colony to the north, but they were important. In 1860, of the 222,000 Chinese 
resident in Indonesia, 67.6 percent were in Java. By 1895 the total had increased to 
469,000, of whom 54.6 percent lived in Java and 45.4 percent in outer Indonesia, with 
33.9 percent of the total in Sumatra. In 1920, of the 809,000 Chinese in Indonesia, only 
47.5 percent were in Java; 52.5 percent were in the other islands, with 37.6 percent of
4 On Chinese revenue farming, see Williams, Overseas Chinese Nationalism, pp. 24ff. In exchange for the 
monopolies, which started during the East Indies Company (VOC) period, before the onset of the 
nineteenth century, the revenue farmers paid licensing fees to the Dutch administration. By the time the 
monopolies—opium, above all—came under challenge in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, the colonial administration was well enough organized to regulate the private economy without 
resorting to private monopolies.
5 Ibid., pp. 126-28. Once the monopolies were removed, the administration considered paying salaries to 
the officieren, but decided against it on the grounds that the wrong men might be attracted.
6 Henri Borel, De Chineezen in Nederlandsch-Indie (Amsterdam: L. J. Veen, 1900), pp. 33-41. The pieces in 
this book were originally published in Indies newspapers.
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the total in Sumatra.7 The numbers of new migrants to outer Indonesia never lent them 
influence to match that of ethnic Chinese in Java, from whom they were distinguished 
in other ways as well. Chinese migrants to outer Indonesia spread out over much 
larger areas and were economically more diverse—miners, plantation workers, 
farmers, and fishermen, as well as small shop owners and substantial businessmen.8 
Many were more oriented to the Chinese communities of Penang, Singapore, and the 
Malayan mainland, where some had recently settled relatives, than to the established 
peranakan groups of Java. Because of the speed and concentration of the new migration, 
it may be that outer island singkeh underwent a slower metamorphosis into baba than 
did those who had preceded them in Java. The outcome was also different, to the 
extent that the cultural habits they absorbed were as different from those of Java as the 
local languages were different from Javanese. The process, however, as the Yap family 
history demonstrates, followed a more or less common pattern.
Family Background
Yap Thiam Hien's paternal great-great-grandfather joined the exodus from south 
China in about 1844. In Chinese kinship the paternal line counts for more than the 
maternal, so that no one in the Yap family remembers much at all about the mother's 
side. As it happens, not much is known either about the great-great-grandfather 
himself. In the family tree sketched by Thiam Hien's father in the late 1940s, he has no 
name. But he was a Hakka from the interior of Kwantung province, the district of Moi- 
yan, sub-district Lo-yi. He settled, after the voyage, in Baturusa, on Bangka Island. 
What exactly he did there is unclear, for while thousands of Chinese had come as 
contract laborers to work in the tin mines, many soon grew pepper instead or fished or 
took up trades or opened shops. In Baturusa he soon married a local Indonesian 
woman, as nameless as he, by whom he shortly had four children—three sons and a 
daughter. The name of the daughter is also unknown, but the three sons, in order, were 
Yap A Kang, Yap A Piang, and Yap A Sin (also known as Yap Sin Tjhong). This third 
son, Yap A Sin, was Thiam Hien's great-grandfather. Born in Baturusa in 1849, he was 
evidently a capable and ambitious man, tough and courageous enough to move on in 
search of better opportunities. It was he who established the family anew in Aceh. 
Exactly how and when he got there is not clear, but the move greatly improved the 
family fortunes.
Aceh was not a particularly hospitable or promising place for Chinese, few of 
whom settled there before the 1870s. The Acehnese apparently were not eager to have 
new foreigners take root, and traders could ply the region without moving in. Aceh 
was thought to be unhealthy—though where was it not then? By the last third of the 
century, moreover, political tension in the area finally broke out into a thirty-year war 
as the Dutch sought, successfully but not easily, to incorporate Aceh definitively into 
the Netherlands-Indies. The Dutch presence created more attractive conditions for
7 See Skinner, "The Chinese Minority," Table 2 at p. 100.
8 On the nineteenth century Chinese immigration to outer Indonesia, see Victor Purcell, The Chinese in 
Southeast Asia, second edition (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 419-34; W. J. Cator, The 
Economic Position o f the Chinese in the Netherlands Indies (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1936), pp. 
127ff.
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Chinese. Traders from Penang had been active in Aceh, but few were willing to take up 
residence until the Dutch began actively to encourage them with land and opium 
revenues in the 1870s. In the early 1880s, Acehnese attacks on Chinese immigrants 
encouraged many of them to leave again.9
In 1875 the Dutch had little success in recruiting indentured labor from China, but 
in 1876 had more luck with labor contractors in Penang and Muntok, in Bangka. At 
about the same time, the Dutch administration appointed a Chinese kapitein.10 In about 
1874 Yap A Sin married the daughter of kapitein Tjoe Ten Hin of Kutaradja, capital of 
Aceh. Tjoe Ten Hin was originally from Pontianak, in west Borneo, where the Dutch 
evidently preferred to recruit their earliest Chinese officers for Aceh from the well- 
established and relatively autonomous Chinese community there. The Kapitein’s 
daughter, Tjoe Koei Yin (1857-1915), was born in west Borneo. How she came upon 
Yap A Sin is not clear, though it may have been arranged by an intermediary in search 
of a husband to suit a fairly well off young woman. If so, this may mean that Yap A Sin 
had already established himself as a success in Baturusa, perhaps as a labor contractor. 
As such he would have been known to Dutch officials and to the Tjoe family in Aceh.
Whatever the case, Yap A Sin and his new wife apparently lived for a short time in 
Baturusa, where their first-born son, Yap Joen Khoy, Thiam Hien's grandfather, was 
born in 1875. Soon thereafter they moved to Kutaradja, where Yap A Sin at length 
succeeded to the lieutenancy, a position earlier held by Tjoe Ten Hin's son (and Koei 
Yin's older brother), Tjoe Lim Tzoy. The latter may have died without a brother to take 
his place, into which Yap A Sin stepped.
Kutaradja then was small but growing and gathering facilities because of the long 
Dutch war of conquest. Dutch civil and military administrations were established 
there, working out of the old Sultan's palace, along with a substantial garrison of 
troops. There was a new mosque, consecrated in 1881, but also a new Christian church, 
which was allowed by the authorities for the benefit of those Dutch and indigenous 
officials who were brought in to administer the war (and such peace as there was). 
There were also Dutch-language schools.
By the 1890s Kutaradja already had a tramline and telegraph, and limited 
telephone service—mainly, no doubt, for military purposes. The population, however, 
though growing, was still small. In 1896, apart from the military camps, there were 
4,799 city residents, of whom 2,427 were Chinese. There were 1,854 ethnic Indonesians. 
These were mainly Acehnese, but also included Minangkabau from West Sumatra— 
one of the mature Yap Thiam Hien's close friends, Jamaluddin Datuk Singomangkuto,
9 J. Langhout, The Economic Conquest o f Acheen by the Dutch (The Hague, 1924). I am grateful to Anthony 
Reid for calling my attention to this source and for making other information from his files available to
me.
10 Communication from Anthony Reid, November 2,1986, whose sources were from English and Dutch 
archives. On political conditions at the time, see Anthony Reid, The Contest for North Sumatra: Atjeh, the 
Netherlands and Britain 1858-1898 (London: Oxford University Press and University of Malaya Press, 1969). 
I have no information on the early Chinese officieren in Aceh, though it may be available in colonial 
archives, but the first or at least an early kapitein may have been Hsieh Yung-kuang (1848-1916), a Hakka 
born in Pontianak. Hsieh traded successfully in Aceh and would have been there at about the time the 
Dutch were trying to encourage immigration. He lost interest in Aceh, however, and moved his 
commercial interests to Penang—not an unusual story. See Yen Ching Hwang, The Overseas Chinese and the 
1911 Revolution (London: Oxford University Press, 1976), pp. 272-73.
104 Daniel S. Lev
was a Minangkabau who grew up in Aceh and went to school with Thiam Hien's 
younger brother. In addition, there were east Sumatrans, Ambonese, Javanese, and 
Menadonese, among others, many of whom worked for the government. Among the 
rest were 158 Europeans (mainly officials), 22 Arabs, and 338 other "foreign orientals," 
presumably Indians, Arabs, and Japanese.11 As in other cities in the colony, each ethnic 
group had its own quarter, a wijk, which in the case of the Chinese particularly was 
something like but not quite a ghetto. The wijk was headed by an unpaid but 
influential wijkmeestert who was responsible for registrations, travel passes, and other 
administrative matters affecting the community. The Chinese wijkmeester in Kutaradja 
during Thiam Hien's early years was his grandfather, Yap Joen Khoy.
Through the early 1910s the family was well off, one of the wealthiest in Kutaradja, 
though by standards in Java or such major Sumatran commercial centers as Medan and 
Palembang the family's lifestyle might well be described as "provincial." The 
population was too small to generate an immense fortune, though inter-island and 
foreign trade (in copra, for example) helped. Yap A Sin's most substantial income may 
have come from the opium monopoly or some share of it, depending on his 
relationship with the kapitein, his father-in-law, about whom I have little information. 
But he also had a coconut plantation, fish ponds, and no doubt other ventures. He and 
his large house, very imposing as his great-great-grandchildren remember it, were the 
hub of the family's existence. At this house the numerous members of the family 
would gather on Sundays. Thiam Hien, as the eldest son of an eldest son, was 
privileged to enter Yap A Sin's bedroom, where he witnessed the old man's 
preparation of opium for smoking.
Yap A Sin's business manager was his first son, Yap Joen Khoy (1875-1919), the 
wijkmeester, who lived in another substantial house owned by his father on the same 
short street. (Still another house on this street was owned by a wealthy trading family, 
the Hoans, into which Thiam Hien's father, Yap Sin Eng, married.) Thiam Hien spent 
his first years in this house, where his parents lived, along with many other family 
members, in their own comfortable quarters. Joen Khoy and his first son, Sin Eng, were 
key transitional figures in the evolution of the Yap family from totok to baba. Only 
forty-four years old when he died, a year before his father, Joen Khoy never had the 
chance to assume the lieutenancy to which he was heir, but apparently he was a 
capable manager of the family enterprises. A stern, handsome man, he belonged to the 
Chinese community but had connections beyond it. His public clothes were not 
European but a somber tunic, not entirely, perhaps, because Dutch officials expected it 
of him. Joen Khoy had worn a queue, as had his sons, but shaved it off (as did his sons) 
after the revolution of 1911 in China and thereafter kept his head nearly bald. Hakka 
was his first language but he may have used some Cantonese or Hokkien—most of his 
charges in Kutaradja were Hakkas and Cantonese, with fewer Hokkiens and Hok- 
Chias, a Hokkien subgroup—but probably not kuo yu (Mandarin). He undoubtedly 
knew Malay and he used Dutch, which he needed for dealing with officials. What is 
more important, he insisted that his children and grandchildren learn Dutch well. With 
his grandchildren, Joen Khoy spoke Dutch. Under social pressure from the local totok 
community, perhaps, he forced the grandchildren to attend a Chinese-language
11 Encydopnedie van Nederlandsch-Indie, vol. II (Hague and Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, E. J. Brill, nd), p. 302.
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(Mandarin) school for a time, but they never took to Mandarin or any other Chinese 
language.
Joen Khoy exercised firm authority over his family, and commanded respect—the 
grandchildren remember him as strict and demanding, befitting a Chinese elder of 
high standing—but there were tensions too, at least with Sin Eng. The root of them had 
to do with a concubine who played a critical part in the lives of Thiam Hien and his 
younger brother and sister. Joen Khoy had married Tjoa Soei Hian (1876-1909), from 
Muntok, who died quite young.12 A couple of years before his wife died, Joen Khoy 
went to Saigon and returned with a young Japanese girl, Sato Nakashima. By all 
accounts she was a remarkable woman. Tjoa Soei Hian was not happy about her, 
naturally. No one would have dared raise an issue with Joen Khoy about it, but Sin 
Eng (Thiam Hien's father) evidently resented Nakashima deeply, supposing that she 
was the cause of the illness that soon killed his mother. In time, however, their 
relationship changed, a matter to be taken up later.
Yap Sin Eng (1894-1949), Joen Khoy's first son, was the first of the line to be 
identifiably as much or more peranakan than totok. Able to speak Hakka and Hokkien, 
he was the last to use any Chinese language well, or at all, and he also spoke Malay 
and Dutch, with a Dutch education, a privilege allowed the children of the officieren, 
like other ethnic elites. He dressed by preference in European style, often modishly. 
Also, he seems to have been generally attracted to things European—for instance, he 
bothered to learn to play the violin (as did Thiam Hien later). Eventually Sin Eng took 
an office job.
Moreover, he took a wife from an unequivocally baba family, of Hokkien origin, an 
indication that singkeh essences had faded in favor of peranakan melding. At age 
eighteeen or nineteen he married Hoan Tjing Nio (1896-1922), who was from a Muntok 
family that had become wealthy in retail trade. Her parents, lacking a son, adopted 
one, a common Chinese custom. For the rest, however, her family had acculturated 
earlier than the Yaps. Tjing Nio's photograph shows a young girl in the typical baba 
dress of Sumatra and Malaysia. At home she and Sin Eng and their children spoke 
Malay—that is, Indonesian—the only language, apparently, that Tjing Nio knew. It 
was also the children's first language.
Thiam Hien's generation of the Yap family, then, the fifth in Indonesia, was 
essentially peranakan. One consequence, which they shared with many others, was 
social marginality, made the more difficult in their case by financial disaster. All three 
of Sin Eng's children turned out to have remarkable character, filled with fibers of 
pride, courage, stubbornness, and responsibility. However one tries to figure out the 
psychological sources of their toughness, about whose quality, I suspect, no one who 
knows them will disagree, the starting place is Kutaradja.
12 Although the men in the family tended to go back to Bangka for their wives, two of Joen Khoy's 
brothers arranged marriages with Hokkien women from Penang (perhaps through intermediaries). Joen 
Khoy had three brothers and two sisters, Thiam Hien's great uncles and aunts. That Joen Khoy also had a 
Hokkien name, Yap Hok Hay, may mean that there were significant commercial or other connections with 
Hokkien communities.
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Thiam Hien's Childhood
Thiam Hien was born on May 25, 1913, his brother Thiam Bong on March 8, 1915, 
and his sister Thiam Lian on January 18, 1917. Two more children followed, a boy and 
a girl, one of whom died in less than a year and the other within two years. For a few 
years they lived comfortably in their own rooms in Joen Khoy's big house, with 
gardens for the children to play in, secure among a host of parents, grandparents, 
aunts, uncles, and cousins. What they lacked, as each of them recalls, was intimacy, 
seldom overdone anyway in many Chinese families, but especially hard to come by 
amidst a crowd of relatives.
What intimacy there was came at first from their mother, Tjing Nio, and later from 
Nakashima, their Japanese omah ("grandmother," in Dutch). Tjing Nio, only sixteen 
when she married Sin Eng, was never very strong. She was tubercular. Five children in 
as many years probably did not help her condition. At Thiam Hien's birth she was just 
seventeen. Only he had much time with her before she died. After a trip to Bangka for 
the wedding of her adoptive brother, Tjing Nio was ill continually until she died in 
August 1922. Thiam Hien was then nine (ten by Chinese reckoning), Thiam Bong 
seven, and Thiam Lian five.
Thiam Hien remembers his mother as loving but also strict for fear that his father 
would be even stricter. As the eldest child, responsible for his siblings, Thiam Hien 
took the most punishment—maybe not very often—from a rattan or hard pinches. (He 
remembers how, when he swam in the river, which was forbidden, and took his 
brother Thiam Bong with him, as he had to, a servant told their mother, who punished 
him severely enough for him to remember it forever.) Thiam Bong recalls his mother 
mainly as weak and constantly sick. Thiam Lian, the youngest, was with her mother all 
the time before she died, yet only for a few years; she remembers her least yet suffered 
the most from Tjing Nio's loss.
As usual then in Chinese families, their father, Sin Eng, was distant. Thiam Lian, 
nicknamed Non, remembers him affectionately, but Hien and Bong never got along 
well with him. Sin Eng was strict, though probably no more so than most Chinese 
fathers of his class and time. He laid down a few hard rules to which there were no 
exceptions. The family had to eat together, the children had to study hard in school, 
and gambling, a common pastime, was forbidden. Once his father came upon Thiam 
Hien and some friends playing a harmless card game. Thinking they were betting, he 
slapped his son, which, despite the injustice of it, evidently drove the point home. 
None of the children, I suspect, ever took to drinking or gambling or other prosaic 
vices even in minor ways. Thiam Hien certainly didn't, and the reasons precede his 
conversion to Protestantism in the 1930s.
For the most part Hien, Bong, and Non did not see all that much of their father or, 
in any event, had only a reserved relationship with him. They were cared for by the 
women of the family, either their mother or grandmothers. There was nothing unusual 
in this, but after Tjing Nio died the distance between Sin Eng and his sons began to fill 
with tension and even dislike—one reason, perhaps, for the huge fund of anger on 
which Thiam Hien always drew. It was naturally a time of turmoil for them, not only 
because their mother had died but because the family empire, such as it was, had 
evaporated. But Sin Eng was still a very young man, only twenty-eight when his wife
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died, and much on the move in search of ways to make a living. He never remarried, 
though once, when Hien was about thirteen, he came close to doing so with a woman 
of mixed European and Chinese parentage. The children hated the idea, partly out of 
loyalty to their mother but also because they did not want a stepmother. For other 
reasons as well, no doubt, the marriage was called off at the last moment. Sin Eng, 
however, had other women friends, and painful and embarrassing rumors got back to 
Hien and Bong. Kutaradja was a small town and the Chinese community even smaller. 
They would not have said anything to their father, of course, but they held it against 
him. Other tensions between Sin Eng and his sons grew indirectly from the dramatic 
collapse of the family fortunes and status. The children were too young to understand 
exactly what happened, but the effects of it lasted a lifetime.
The wealth on both sides of the family disappeared in a short period during the 
1910s and early 1920s, a bad time for the officier class. As a six- or seven-year-old boy, 
Hien experienced the decline as a puzzling diminution of the ang pow (gifts of money) 
given him by the patriarch Yap A Sin: from the substantial ringgit to a rijksdaalder, soon 
a guilder, and finally only a half guilder, each coin oddly smaller than the last. It was a 
metaphor of the calamity visited on the family as the lieutenancy slipped away and all 
their property disappeared.
Years later, maybe with a touch of Protestant moralism, Thiam Hien wondered 
whether the misfortune was not visited on his great-grandfather for the sin of selling 
opium. More likely, however, it was because Yap A Sin could no longer sell opium. For 
the same reason, the luitenant position was no great loss. The institution of officieren 
had already begun to fall apart. Chinese revenue farming—the monopolies over 
opium, gambling, slaughtering, and so on—was restricted before the end of the 
century and abolished afterward.13 The effect on Chinese officieren throughout the 
colony was evidently immediate, making the positions much less attractive; and the 
administration was unable thereafter to make them more so. Only if they had already 
begun to diversify and invest well could the officieren families recoup the losses from 
revenue farming. Many went broke. Yap A Sin had taken out loans from banks and 
companies to support his ventures in the copra trade, among others, a bad investment 
at the time. His enterprises failed in the economically difficult years following the first 
world war. The loans were called in, either during the last year of his life or 
immediately after his death, and the family went bankrupt.14 The houses, including 
Joen Khoy's (in which Thiam Hien spent his first years), were sold, along with the 
coconut plantation, and the family goods were auctioned off.
At the same time, the once profitable store owned by the Hoan family, on Hien's 
mother's side, went under, but for different reasons. The store, named Muntok after 
the homebase in Bangka, and the bakery—after which their grounds were named the 
kebon roti (bread garden), and whose wonderful aromas Thiam Hien loved and where 
he could get hot rolls—used to sell heavily to the Dutch officers and soldiers in town. 
In the end those were not the best customers. Many of them left on transfers without
13 Williams, Overseas Chinese Nationalism, pp. 24ff and 126-28.
14 Yap used the term "bankrupt," but it is not clear that what happened involved a legal action. It may be 
that all the family's property was simply sold off to pay the accumulated debts. In either case the effect 
was much the same, not the least being the shame and a serious decline in social status.
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paying off their substantial chits for supplies and liquor. Especially at the end of each 
year, large bills were run up for Christmas celebrations. The eternal hope that all 
would eventually be paid never worked out. It may also be that by the early 1920s, as 
mopping-up operations following the "pacification" wound down, the military 
garrison and the Hoan's clientele, reliable or not, shrank. For a while Sin Eng helped in 
the store, trying to balance the accounts, because he had worked in the Kutaradja 
branch of the Javaasche Bank soon after graduating from high school and understood 
accounts. But it ended badly, and the store and bakery also disappeared by the mid- 
1920s.
For the children this was a time of instability, to put it mildly, beginning with Joen 
Khoy's death and the disappearance of Yap A Sin's estate. By no means were they 
destitute, however. Resources were available from the extended families of Yaps and 
Hoans. But they were suddenly dependent on others, albeit relatives, a condition to 
which Thiam Bong, especially, but the others, too, were sensitive. When Yap A Sin's 
houses were sold, the family had to move into the big house still owned by Tjing Nio's 
family. The children were not happy there, for their maternal great-grandmother ruled 
over the household with a heavy dictatorial hand. They stayed there after their mother 
died, until Sin Eng, who had gone to Batavia to find work, returned with a friend to 
start a supply and catering business serving the military garrison. The children, Non 
especially, disliked this young man, who they thought had a bad influence on their 
father. From Sigli, in provincial Aceh, he and Sin Eng spent much time together, men 
about town. It was then that rumors flew about Sin Eng. But the business went well for 
a few years, and Sin Eng rented an apartment in a house owned by the Japanese 
widow of a Swiss officer in the colonial army, so that the children, Nakashima (omah), 
and father were on their own again. Later they rented a substantial house owned by 
the new kapitein. While there, Sin Eng bought a car, a small Austin, which Thiam Hien 
was once allowed to drive as a reward for good grades when he returned home during 
his first year in Java. But the business declined, and Sin Eng gave it up. When he 
returned to Batavia for good, probably in 1927, to work as a clerk in a commercial 
house, the children and their omah had to move again to a single room in a house 
owned by one of Joen Khoy's younger sisters. From there they moved again to an 
uncle's place. And so it went. In better times the family had a place of its own, in worse 
times they were farmed out to relatives.
From Hien's and Bong's point of view, Sin Eng was somehow responsible for their 
decline, or at least he failed to make up for it. For this, too, they never quite forgave 
him. And their resentment—never expressed to him, for his patripotestal privilege 
made that impossible—may have been tinged with a bit of contempt. In peranakan 
circles, success was even more important than for totok, in good part, perhaps, because 
of a sense that the Dutch were watching and maybe the Indonesian elite, too, not just 
other Chinese.
Sin Eng seemed to flit from job to job, trying this and that, as his sons saw it. 
Actually, good times were interspersed with bad times, but steady financial stability 
and security were in the past. For whatever reasons of character, skill, and 
opportunity, Sin Eng could not replace the family fortune. Like many peranakan sons, 
especially from officier families, Sin Eng may not have been especially well suited to 
business. He could not, like a singkeh, start from the bottom to accumulate capital. Nor,
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apparently, did he have contacts with capital to spare in Aceh or in Java. But with a 
Dutch-language high-school education, he had other possibilities and may have 
preferred the risk-free security and social status of an office employee. His one 
business venture, the catering service, which he established with his friend from Sigli, 
eventually failed, and he never tried again. He was also young enough—only twenty 
years older than Thiam Hien—and in some ways high-living enough not to scrimp on 
money merely for the sake of his sons. He might have saved for their educations by 
taking out insurance policies, as some parents did, but lacking foresight, knowledge, or 
concern, or maybe even money, he did not. Thiam Hien and Thiam Bong believed they 
suffered for it.
They did, though not in fact all that much. No less than most Chinese fathers, 
especially from educated baba strata, Sin Eng saw to it that his sons got good 
educations. When they wanted to go to Java to finish their studies, he made it possible 
for them. It was their sister, Lian (Non), who was hurt most by their father's 
inadequate income. A sensitive child, she felt most the lack of a mother and the 
frequent absence of her father. Imaginative, intelligent, and as ambitious as her 
brothers, she was also a daughter in a culture oriented to sons. Once out of the Dutch- 
language primary school, she too wanted to go to Java to continue her education. Sin 
Eng told her that her brothers had prior claim to support from the family's resources, 
that a woman had less need for education. When first Hien and then Bong left for Java, 
Non stayed behind in Aceh, until the late 1930s.15 She nevertheless found an 
opportunity to study in a new Catholic school, which in time invited her to join the 
teaching staff. While still in Kutaradja she was baptized a Catholic, years before Hien 
became a Protestant.
Nakashima
After their mother died, the central figure in the lives of Hien, Bong, and Non was 
their Japanese Omah, Sato Nakashima (18907-1949). From here I capitalize "Omah," 
Dutch familiar for "grandmother" (as already explained), only because they talked 
about her that way. Nothing is so odd in the family's history and Thiam Hien's as this 
woman. Some basic information about her is missing, unfortunately, because just 
before the Japanese invasion in early 1942 the Hien family panicked and destroyed her 
passport and other papers to protect her. (It was Thiam Hien who actually did so.) The 
children were utterly devoted to her; even in old age, each of them saw her still as a 
fundamental, formative influence.
When Joen Khoy brought her back with him from Saigon, she was no more than 
seventeen. Born around 1890 in Nagasaki, she left as a teenager—as did many others 
leave a crowded Japan that was in the process of remaking itself. She traveled to 
Southeast Asia to live with a relative and find work. According to the only credible 
explanation I have heard—from Thiam Lian—about how she got to Kutaradja, Joen
15 Thiam Lian remained behind in Kutaradja for years after Hien and Bong departed to Java. She was there 
long enough to ask, as a grown woman, sensitive questions about the family and to listen to stories told by 
her relatives.
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Khoy met her in a Japanese-owned store in Saigon, where he bought supplies.16 
Nakashima worked there for an aunt. When, half joking, he asked whether he could 
take the girl, the guardian replied, in effect, why not? Joen Khoy never legally married 
her, even after his wife died. It was mentioned earlier that Sin Eng resented her, and no 
doubt others in the family did not like her intrusion, but she was close to Joen Khoy, 
and the children took her for granted as part of the family.
Outsider though she was, Nakashima made herself a respected member of the Yap 
family. Intelligent and unwilling to be idle, she had skills—as a seamstress, among 
other things—and involved herself assiduously in the family's weddings and other 
rituals. But she was best known as a midwife. She delivered many of the Yap family's 
babies and did the same for others who asked for her help, even when doctors were 
available. It is possible that she helped to deliver Hien, Bong, and Lian. Apparently she 
was well known in the small town of Kutaradja. Sometimes homesick and lonely, in 
the limited Japanese community in Kutaradja Nakashima found friends with whom 
she could speak in her own language and play cards. But she moved rather freely in 
other communities as well, one of few who ignored the real and implicit ghetto lines.
Nakashima returned to Japan twice in the 1910s. On the first trip, a few years 
before the world war broke out, she adopted the son of her younger brother. Her 
family was poor, and her own secure position in Aceh enabled her to help the boy. If 
this was the reason, it may explain why she decided to remain in Kutaradja after Joen 
Khoy died. In any event, she brought her nephew to Kutaradja for a time before taking 
him back to Japan (Nagasaki) to begin school.17 None of this would have been thought 
strange by the Yap family, for the adoption of children, often from relatives, was 
common in Chinese custom, as it is also in ethnic Indonesian societies. Nakashima's 
nephew was educated in a naval academy. Sometime in the 1920s, while still a cadet, 
he contracted cholera and died in Bangkok, according to Thiam Lian. Nakashima never 
returned to Japan thereafter. Lian believes that she swore never to go back once she 
received news of her nephew's death. After World War II, when Thiam Hien returned 
from his studies in Holland and offered to take her home to Nagasaki, she refused 
because she knew, she said, that all of her family had been destroyed by the atomic 
bomb.
When Joen Khoy died, Nakashima was not yet thirty. Whatever his misgivings, Sin 
Eng, as Joen Khoy's only child, assumed responsibility for her, and she moved in with 
his family. In turn, when Tjing Nio died, Nakashima assumed responsibility for Hien, 
Bong, and Lian. Along with Sin Eng's other resentments of Nakashima, he may have 
become jealous of her close relationship with his children, as Non thought, but he
16 Thiam Hien and Thiam Bong did not know how their Omah reached Aceh. By the turn of the century 
there were many Japanese residents in the colony—and elsewhere in Southeast Asia. Only a small number 
ended up in Aceh.
17 When, exactly, Nakashima went to Japan the first and second times is not clear, because Hien, Bong, and 
Lian were all too young to remember. Lian believes she may have taken her adopted son back to Nagasaki 
just before the war broke out, was caught there when hostilities began, and stayed for the duration. It is 
even possible, according to Lian, that she was in Japan when Joen Khoy died, but returned anyway 
because of her affection for the Yap children. There may be some truth to this, for by then Nakashima was 
fully at home in the family and belonged there as much as anywhere else. But it is also true that no other 
place offered her quite so much by way of home and family and support as did Kutaradja.
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nevertheless depended on her taking care of the youngsters since he was seldom 
around.
Devoted to the children, she gathered them in at a critical time in their youth. Hien 
was six or seven when she joined them and barely nine when his mother died. If one 
can identify any single extraordinary influence on the kinds of adults Hien, Bong, and 
Non became, it had to be Nakashima. After Tjing Nio's death they spent more time, 
more intimately, with her than anyone else, and in ways out of the usual for Chinese 
families. The children all remember her as very strong psychologically, but, as Bong 
put it, you could not see her strength, only feel it: "She was wonderful, a remarkable 
woman. She never raised her voice, never. But what she told us stayed in our minds. 
She was mother, father, and grandmother at the same time. Our father was not often at 
home. She was the only person who took care of us."18
The family talked in Malay, which Nakashima never completely mastered, but 
although she spoke with a heavy accent, she nevertheless managed to make herself 
understood. At home, wherever home happened to be, she cooked, made clothes— 
putting up with Thiam Hien's protests over her choice of style when he was in 
school—and in many ways established a center of gravity for them. Nakashima liked 
to sleep late, and the children made their own breakfasts. However, on days when 
Hien had an examination at school she would make him a breakfast of miso soup to 
calm his nerves. Then she would wait for him to come home to tell him that he had 
done well and that his test score would be good. On birthdays she cooked Japanese 
noodles for long life. Hien had a lifelong taste for Japanese food.
More by example than instruction, apparently, for she was literate but not well 
educated, she also taught them values, some of which were bound to challenge those 
of the Chinese community. When necessary she confronted the children's teachers, 
even Dutch teachers—in broken Malay no less, whose effect one can imagine— 
something Chinese parents, including Sin Eng, out of respect for the authority of 
teachers, were exceedingly reluctant to do. Nakashima, evidently, was not overly 
impressed by the privileges of authority, an inclination she may well have passed on to 
her charges.
She read to the children often—rather, she translated and then explained to them 
what she read in books borrowed from her Japanese friends. She and the three children 
would lie in bed, Hien always on her right, Lian on her left, and poor Bong always at 
her feet and resenting the favor shown Hien, while Nakashima read or told them 
stories about great men and heroes—particularly samurai and their bushido code—but 
also Thomas Edison and the like. From those stories she drew moral and ethical 
lessons. They were simple lessons drawn simply: don't be afraid if you are right, 
because those who are right will win out in the end; be courageous and loyal, like the 
samurai; and be honest. Nakashima herself, unsophisticated but firmly constructed, 
took all of those virtues quite seriously and lived her life accordingly.
Thiam Hien seems to have been her favorite; Bong was not entirely imagining 
things. Thiam Hien was the eldest, already a bit independent, quite bright, and 
devoted to Nakashima. But for all three she provided security, affection, intimacy, and
18 Yap Thiam Bong, Arnhem, August 6,1987.
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a rich source of character. Her own values and her "Japaneseness" (kejepangan), as 
Thiam Hien once characterized it, also offered a counterpoint to Chinese baba, totok, 
Dutch, and local Indonesian norms and their peculiar interaction in the colonial 
setting.
Legal Redefinition
For one of the most important advantages in Thiam Hien's life—European legal 
status—he had to be grateful to Sin Eng. Indeed, Thiam Hien might not have 
undertaken the steps for such legal assimilation for himself. In most colonies, some 
provision was eventually made for allowing local people to assimilate, in some 
measure, to European status. The application and approval process, always a source 
both of pride and ignominy, depending on who was judging, was a means of linking 
elites, of emphasizing European superiority, and of rewarding advantageous behavior. 
Such formal assimilation was always problematic, and few took the necessary steps. 
For instance, the French mission civilisatrice made it necessary, at least ethically, to 
reward with legal French status—citizenship—any Vietnamese or Algerian, for 
example, who had a French education, spoke French, behaved French, was to all 
intents and purposes French. In the Netherlands-Indies, the law was a bit different but 
the essence was much the same. In the nineteenth century certain ethnic Indonesian 
aristocrats and high civilian and military officials were subject to the same criminal- 
law provisions as Dutch nationals. If they (and eventually others) were interested and 
could demonstrate that they spoke Dutch and lived essentially by Dutch cultural 
norms, they could request legal equivalence (gelijkstelling) with the Dutch. Few enough 
ever did so. The same advantage was opened to ethnic Chinese in the early twentieth 
century, in part no doubt as a compromise solution to a widespread Chinese demand 
to be accorded the same European status as were the Japanese at the beginning of the 
century. Japan had won the prized European status by its convincing development of 
military might during the last few decades since the Meiji Restoration. Some politically 
conscious ethnic Chinese thought they deserved the same, to distinguish them from 
native Indonesians, rather missing the point that they lacked the convincing weight of 
an army and navy. By this time in colonial history, however, what with sparks of 
nationalism, new local organizations, and tensions generated by the new Ethical Policy 
meant to upgrade the Indonesian population, the colonial administration sensed a 
necessity to make concessions. Consequently, while refusing to consider the gift of 
Dutch status to Chinese generally, the colonial administration did allow them, like 
significant ethnic Indonesians, to apply for gelijkstelling.
As in the case of ethnic Indonesians, not all that many ethnic Chinese actually did 
so, though proportionately more Chinese than Indonesians took the step of formal 
application. Many ethnic Chinese treated the process, and those who undertook it, 
with contempt and derision. From the cost of the stamps required to register the 
application or affixed on the return letter that informed registrants of their success, 
those granted the new status were called "penny and half Hollanders," or Belanda toen- 
phoa, among ethnic Chinese.19 In the years 1910 through 1920, after which the 
conversion was no longer allowed, a total of 3,610 applications for gelijkstelling were
19 See Setiono, Tionghoa dalam Pusaran Politik, pp. 472ff.
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approved, of which 1,711 (47.39 percent) were ethnic Chinese.20 One of them was Yap 
Sin Eng, whose conversion, so to speak, also applied to his three children. The 
transformation was announced officially, in a list of about sixty names, in a statutory 
instrument (Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indie, 1918, no. 49). The immediate, 
instantaneous, impact of the proclamation was that henceforth Jap Sin Eng—Jap is the 
Dutch spelling—became Sin Eng Jap, and Jap Thiam Hien became Thiam Hien Jap. 
There is no way of knowing now why exactly Sin Eng took this remarkable step. He 
might have hoped for some advantageous consequences for himself, at least a more 
weighty status in society, or more respect from Dutch officials and others, though there 
is no evidence in the children's memories that he achieved either one. The family's 
fortunes were then already in decline, and on the verge of serious consequences, and it 
is conceivable that Sin Eng sought some kind of symbolic reassurance as his officieren- 
rooted prominence slipped away. None of these possibilities makes a lot of sense, 
however, for the rewards to Sin Eng himself could not have impressed him all that 
much. There was little enough from European legal status alone that would redound to 
his advantage. It is more likely that he had the children in mind, precisely because they 
might well lose the privileges once assured to the officieren and their families. Sin Eng 
himself had a Dutch high school education, which lent him some assurance of both 
status and employment. If the family lost its position, however, or the officieren were no 
longer needed, Thiam Hien and his brother and sister might very well lose that critical 
advantage.
It may be that Sin Eng's one most generous and lasting gift to his son was the 
opportunity of a good education. Without it, it is hard to imagine Yap Thiam Hien.
20 Many more ethnic Chinese applied for a different process of limited legal adaptation called the 
voluntary submission to European private law (vrijwillige otiderwerping aan het Europeesch privaatrecht), 
promulgated in a 1917 statute. See A. C. Tobi, De Vrijwillige Onderwerping aan het Europeesch Privaatrecht 
(Ind. Stbl. 1917, no. 12) (Leiden: van Doesburgh, 1927). In this case, many more ethnic Chinese, along with 
others, would have applied in connection with business interests and transactions. It did not, however, 
redefine one's personal status.
